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RHETORICAL TRACTION: DEFINITIONS A N D INSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS IN JU D IC IA L OPINIONS A BO U T W ILDERNESS ACCESS
Steve Schwarze* Almost every spring for the past eight years, I m ade a phone call to M aryland in order to get into M innesota. A n office in M aryland houses the reservation system for the Boundary W aters C anoe A rea W ilder ness, a one-million acre preserve in the northeastern tip of M innesota that is the m ost visited unit of the N ational W ilderness Preservation System. This office acts as a m edium of and barrier to m y access to the W ilderness; it issues perm its to groups of people wishing to enter the B oundary W a ters, and it limits the num ber of parties that m ay enter at a given point on a particular day. Although the W ilderness is public land, I m ust first gain perm ission from a state in stitution to enter the B oundary W aters.
T hat perm it is only one of the keys needed to unlock the d oor to the Boundary W aters. I also m ust pass through a ranger station on the day I enter to confirm m y perm it and ensure that I view a short video
* Steve Schwarze is an Assistant Professor in the Department o f Communication Studies at the University o f
Montana. An earlier version o f this essay was presented a t the 2000 N atio n al C o m m u n icatio n A ssociation C o n v en tio n , S eattle, W A , T h e a u th o r thanks Shiv G anesh, S ara H ay d en , C h ristin e O rav ec, E dw ard S chiappa, an d the an o n y m o u s review ers for th eir helpful feedback on this essay. about the wilderness ethic of "Leave No Trace." Going into the wilderness does not m ean m erely entering a supposedly u n tainted, uninhabited area; it requires that people interact with the environm ent in ways that the Forest Service has deem ed appropriate. Indeed, m y yearly trips to the Boundary W aters involve m ore than just packing up m y gear and heading north; m ore than catching fish and m aking cam p fires; m ore than escaping the sights and sounds of the city and relaxing in solitude. These trips require m e to play by the rules set by the state. T he rules and regulations, the perm its and videos, all affect m y sheer physical presence in the wilderness. Passing through the wilderness m eans passing through the state.
W ilderness, as it has com e to be articu lated in the U nited States, is neither an in herent quality of the natural world, nor a state of mind. N or is it the cultural commonsense about wilderness, the dom inant m ode of speaking and writing about wilderness. For better or worse, wilderness is a construc tion o f state institutions. A lthough environ mentalists, philosophers and ethicists have written prolifically about the m eaning o f wil- RHETORICAL TRACTION dem ess and its contradictions,1 scholars have given far less attention to the question o f how these m eanings and contradictions get resolved by governing institutions for the practical purpose of m anaging wilderness ar eas.2 This essay addresses that question by exam ining argum ents produced by govern ing institutions that have a direct im pact on the m anagem ent and hum an experience of established wilderness areas. I take as m y case studies the controversies concerning wilderness m anagem ent in two areas: the Boundary W aters C anoe A rea W ilderness in M innesota and the wilderness portion of D e nali N ational Park in Alaska.
Specifically, I focus m y attention on ju d i cial opinions that address the issue o f m otor ized access to the Boundary W aters and D e nali. I exam ine judicial opinions because they are texts by which state institutions p ro vide tem porary resolutions of ongoing p u b lic controversies. Especially in the last de cade, individuals and interest groups have engaged in several controversies in order to influence public policy regarding the use of trucks, off-road vehicles and snowmobiles as m odes of access and recreation on federal lands, including wilderness areas.
Advocates of m otorized use have ex ploited ambiguity in wilderness legislation and m anagem ent plans to gain rhetorical traction for argum ents about m otorized use in certain areas of designated wilderness. These argum ents often get lodged in the This essay dem onstrates that judicial opin ions rely on two related types of argum ent to resolve ambiguities in wilderness policy: def initional argum ents and institutional argu ments. Judicial opinions surrounding m otor ized use em ploy definitional arguments in order to clarify ambiguous policy prescrip tions regarding wilderness management. H ow ever, these definitional arguments often get resolved through argum ents about insti tutional authority. Decisions about which definition shall be accepted get supported by argum ents about the specific governing insti tution that has authority to establish that def inition. In fact, ongoing philosophical de bates about the m eaning of wilderness fade into the background as courts attem pt to fix definitional authority within a particular in stitution. W ithin the courts, then, institu tional argum ents have prim acy over defini tional arguments. Institutional arguments provide justification for the court's resolution or deferral of definitional arguments.
Identifying these two types of argum ent and the relationship between them is useful for elaborating theories o f rhetoric and argu m entation and for assessing rhetorical strat egies in current m otorized use controversies. In terms of rhetorical theory, this essay con tributes to ongoing discussions about the characteristics and functions of definitions in processes of argum entation.3 It does so by specifying institutional argum ents as a signif icant influence on definitions that get fixed as part of the policy process. Recent essays have identified other influences on defini tions, such as political and econom ic inter ests (Schiappa 1996) , racist beliefs (McGee), and the ideology of norm alcy (Titsworth).
Scholars also have identified a variety of influences on the definitions of wilderness and related term s in public policy (Callicott and Nelson; N ash; Oelschlager) . W hile both the argum entation literature and the wilder ness literature successfully discern forces that m otivate particular definitions, the cases dis cussed in this essay point to another influence-argum ents about institutional authority-that has little to do with the definitions themselves. T hat is, regardless of the beliefs and assumptions that m ight have contrib uted to definitions of "wilderness" or notions of w hat counts as an appropriate m eans of "access" to wilderness areas, the definitions that get fixed b y judicial opinions are ulti m ately justified by the courts through the use of argum ents regarding institutional author ity. Thus, it is im portant for argum entation scholars to consider institutional argum ents as yet another im portant influence on the resolution of definitional issues in policy ar guments.
Second, this essay contributes to scholar ship that explores institutional argum ent, es pecially in the realm of environm ental issues (Doxtader; Peterson). It does so b y showing how argum ents about institutional authority function to negotiate the legitimacy of gov erning institutions. As Erik D oxtader has claimed in his work on institutional argu m ent, "Discussions of particular policy choices often affirm the general authority of institutional practices of reasoning and cod ify norm s of public interest" (185). In the cases I exam ine, policy prescriptions about motorized access ultimately turn on arguments about institutional authority. By explaining and clarifying the relationship betw een insti tutional and definitional argum ents, I intend to show how institutional argum ents operate as a specific form o f argum ent that not only shapes the concrete execution of public pol icy but also contributes in com plex ways to the legitimation of state power.
T o the extent that these argum ents con tribute to the legitimation of state power, SCHWARZE they also play an im portant role in the p ro cesses of hegem ony that have draw n the attention of several theorists and critics in com m unication studies. This points to a third theoretical contribution of the essay; it suggests that studies of hegem ony could ben efit by accounting for the specific role that state rhetorics play in the process o f consent formation. W hile m any studies of hegem ony have exam ined civil society rhetorics in or der to challenge the notion of a monolithic, univocal "dom inant ideology," this turn to ward civil society has often neglected how state institutions contribute the hegem onic process. T he m otorized access cases show how institutional argum ents intended to clar ify the authority of state institutions can si multaneously erode the legitimacy of those institutions. If the analysis of hegem ony is concerned with the process of negotiating consent to the established order, then it is imperative to analyze the rhetorics by which the established order contributes to consent and dissent. O n a more practical level, m y analysis can help critics and advocates assess arguments about m otorized use on other public lands. Arguments about access in the Boundary W aters and D enali have re-em erged in other m anagem ent controversies. T he Interior D e partm ent's proposed ban on snowmobiles in national parks is an especially salient exam ple of how argum ents get taken up in new controversies. An Anchorage Daily News arti cle about a 1999 lawsuit over snowmobile regulations in Denali encapsulates this argu m entative move: "Both sides say the case could carry weight far beyond the borders of Denali. T he debate has com e to symbolize a much broader struggle over snowmachining in Alaska and in national parks across the country" (Komamitsky). Public arguments by advocates for m otorized use provide clear evidence for such an assertion. Advocates have continued to pursue argum ents about access during the process of developing the W inter Use Plan in Yellowstone and G rand RHETORICAL TRACTION Teton N ational Parks, proposed off road ve hicle bans on other federal lands, and the Bureau of Land M anagem ent's proposed National Off-Highway V ehicle Strategy. In the conclusion of the essay, I briefly discuss how m y analysis provides a useful point of departure for interpreting and intervening in other m anagem ent controversies.
T he essay is divided into three major-sec tions. In the first two sections, I analyze the judicial opinions in the B oundary W aters and D enali controversies. I introduce each of these sections by contextualizing the contro versies in relation to the ambiguous term s of federal wilderness policy. In the analysis, I explain how the am biguity of key term s such as "wilderness," "feasible" m eans of "ac cess," and "traditional activities" allow advo cates to gain rhetorical traction for their p o sitions; but ultimately, the courts resolve these ambiguities through argum ents about institutional authority. In the third section, I expand on the theoretical and practical im plications suggested above. D e f in in g " F e a s ib l e " : T h e C a s e o f t h e B o u n d a r y W a t e r s T he issue of m otorized portages has been at the heart of the ongoing m anagem ent con troversies in the B oundary W aters Canoe A rea W ilderness. Travel from one lake to another in the Boundary W aters often in volves portaging canoes and equipm ent around rapids and other impasses. Although m ost portages force travelers to carry their gear across footpaths from one body of water to the next, a few of the longer and m ore rugged portages have been developed as m e chanical portages. Initially used for logging operations in the early p art of the 20th cen tury (Proescholdt 4 6 -4 7 ), these m echanical portages have since been staffed by private truck operators who help travelers load gear, boats and canoes onto flatbed trucks and then transport the gear over portages to the next lake or river. These portages have long T he A ct m andated closure of these portages unless the Forest Service found "no feasible nonm otorized m eans of transporting boats across the portages" (Boundary W aters Act, Section 4(f)).
T he ambiguity of the term "feasible" in this clause provided rhetorical traction for advocates, sustaining the controversy well beyond the 1984 deadline and resulting in two judicial opinions in the early 1990s that I will analyze in this section of the essay. Initially, the Forest Service declared that on the basis of their field trials, there was no feasible alternative to m otorized portages, thus keeping the three portages motorized. W ilderness preservation groups fought this decision (among others) through the adm in istrative appeals process, but failed to achieve closure of those portages. Finally, in Jan u ary 1990 wilderness groups brought ac tion in federal district court to overturn the Forest Service's decision. In 1991, the Dis trict C ourt upheld the Forest Service, but in 1992, the Appeals C ourt reversed that deci sion (Friends o f the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Robertson, 1991 and 1992) . T h e Suprem e C ourt refused to h ear a subsequent appeal brought b y local interest groups. In both the District C ourt decision and the Appeals C ourt reversal, the crux o f the opinions was the judicial interpretation of the term "feasi ble."
T h e D istrict C ourt O p in io n
T he plaintiffs in the District C ourt case, wilderness preservation groups, claim ed that there is a "feasible" m eans of boat transpor tation: portage wheels. Based on their own tests as well as those perform ed by the Forest Service, preservationist groups claim ed it is possible (therefore, in their view, "feasible") for travelers to use these wheels to assist hum an-pow ered transportation across p o r tages. The preservationists sought judicial re view of the agency's decision because, in their view, the decision to m aintain the m o torized portages violated the Boundary W a ters Act, the W ilderness Act, and "the obli gation delegated to [the Forest Service Chief] by Congress to m anage the Boundary W aters with a presum ption in favor of wil derness values " (Friends v. Robertson, 1991 , 1388 -1389 .
T h e defendants, the U nited States Forest Service, argued that the C ourt should "defer to the administrative finding of nonfeasibil ity," since the B oundary W aters Act "leaves this decision to the C hief of the Forest Ser vice" (1389). T here are two significant ele m ents to this argum ent, one definitional and the other institutional. First, the Forest Ser vice claims that no nonm otorized m eans of transportation fits the definition of "feasible." As evidence, they offer results of their field studies that show how transporting boats physically generated significant health and safety risks. Given this evidence, the Forest SCHWARZE Service suggests that physically transporting equipm ent over portages does n o t fall under the definition of "feasible." Second, this def initional argum ent works hand in hand with an institutional argum ent about the appro priate authority for determ ining this defini tion. The Forest Service claims that C on gress delegated decisions about "feasible" transportation to the agency; therefore, the Forest Service's decision should not be a m atter for legal dispute. Thus, the argum ent of the Forest Service hinges both on a defi nition of "feasible" as well as a determ ination of which governing institution has the au thority to define the term.
The first part of the court's opinion shows how these institutional and definitional ques tions are intertwined. To judge the com pet ing definitional claims, the District C ourt turns to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and a series of precedent cases to provide the appropriate scope for their re view. This results in the court articulating the doctrine of "substitute judgm ent," which lim its the institutional authority of the court: "Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultim ate standard of review is a narrow one. T he court is not em pow ered to substitute its judgm ent for that of the agency " (1389) . This limitation on the court's authority marks an im portant in stitutional influence on the definition of "fea sible." T he APA provides param eters for ju dicial review of agency decisions, and makes clear that while the court m ust "consider w hether the decision was based on a consid eration of the relevant factors and w hether there has been a clear error of judgm ent," it cannot replace the agency's decision with its own judgm ent.
H owever, the court does have the author ity to interpret statutes; thus, the court's def initions of statutory terms and phrases have authority in the developm ent of m anage m ent policy. In this opinion, the court en gages almost exclusively in definitional argu ments to support their opinion. As the court puts it, "This case ultim ately turns on the meaning of 'feasible' as used in the BWCAW Act" (1390) . T o generate this definition, the court turns to a Suprem e C ourt decision, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, which exam ined the use of the w ord "feasible" in a case about building a highway through a city park. H ow ever, the court asserts that the Overton Park case is not a "direct analogue" to the Boundary W aters case, and so they do not simply use the definition of "feasible" from Overton Park. R ather, the court says that in Overton Park the Suprem e C ourt consid ered the definition of "feasible" within the context of that particular park. So, the Dis trict C ourt proceeds by constructing the con text of "wilderness" in order to define feasi bility within the Boundary W aters.
This strategy of contextualization requires the court to m ake a definitional argum ent about the m eaning of "wilderness." H ow ever, the court's interpretation of the statu tory language regarding "wilderness" also al lows the court to develop a questionable position regarding "access" as a fundam ental purpose of wilderness m anagem ent. Invok ing the definition of wilderness used in the 1964 W ilderness Act, the court claims that the words of the act "ring hollow if this carefully protected wilderness is without h u m an appreciators" (1390). W ith this asser tion, the court sets up a logic of balancing that they believe underlies wilderness p ro tection. T he court says that the Boundary W aters Act "seeks to balance protections of wilderness with public access to that w ilder ness" (1391). In this logic, the desire for a protected wilderness m ust be balanced with the desire for an accessible wilderness that can be appreciated b y hum an beings.
This balancing act is based on two ques tionable rhetorical moves. First, the court positions access and preservation as equally im portant policy objectives, even though the term "access" appears now here in the W il derness Act. Through this positioning, the court creates an obligation (insuring access WINTER 2002 for all) that is not stated in the statutory definition of wilderness. Fram ing wilderness m anagem ent in terms of these allegedly equal objectives makes it easier for the court to refute argum ents for limiting access. Sec ond, the court tries to emphasize the im por tance of access by describing a hypothetical situation of a wilderness so strictly "pre served" that it would be "w ithout hum an appreciators." This is a red herring: the situ ation is neither what the m anagem ent plan proposes, nor what the W ilderness Act states. T he plan does not prohibit access or prevent appreciation; it m erely limits the type o f transportation one m ay use in specific areas. Further, the A ct explicitly requires wilder ness areas to provide "outstanding opportu nities for solitude or a primitive and uncon fined type of recreation" (Section 2(c)). Overall, then, the District C ourt's opinion invokes a version of "wilderness" that pre sents wilderness m anagem ent as the out com e of a precarious balancing act between preservation and access. W hile this balanc ing act m ay help the court argue against further regulation of access in the Boundary W aters, it poses a false dilem m a that ignores the parts of the statute and the proposed m anagem ent plan that give prim acy to pro tecting the wilderness.
Nonetheless, after defining access as a fun dam ental goal of the W ilderness Act, the court proceeds to interpret the Boundary W aters Act in light of this goal. In effect, the court's opinion defines "feasible" in a way that favors access over preservation. To de velop this definition, the court makes two arguments about how a ban on motorized access would subvert Congress's intent in including the term "feasible" in the Act. First, Congress obviously could not have in tended "feasible" to function as producing a universal ban on m otorized access, since the B oundary W aters Act contains language that does ban other m otorized portages. H ad Congress intended a universal ban, the court argues, they could have written that into the law instead of providing a clause allowing for access alternatives. Second, the legisla tive history of the B oundary W aters A ct also precludes a universal b an on m otorized ac cess. Since the A ct clearly accom m odated com peting interests regarding wilderness, and since earlier versions of the bill argued for a com plete ban on m otorized access, the feasibility criterion could not have been in tended to require com plete elim ination of the motorized portages. H ow ever, these two arguments suggest only that the feasibility criterion cannot be interpreted as requiring an absolute ban. T hey leave open the possi bility that m otorized portages could be elim inated, unless the Forest Service determ ined that there was no feasible alternative.
Im portantly, the latter phrase emphasizes that the Forest Service ultim ately has the institutional authority to define "feasible." T h e District C ourt's opinion simply uses a series of definitional argum ents to declare the Forest Service's definitions and decision to be reasonable. Referring to the definition articulated by the Forest Chief, the court states, "M ore fundam entally, 'feasible,' as used in the context of a wilderness which is to be available to the general citizen ry is m ore properly thought of as 'reasonably convenient or usable '" (1392) . T he court goes on to concur with the C h iefs decision in a way consistent with their earlier con cerns about access: "H ere the Chief, and this Court, m ust focus on matters of hum an ca pabilities in conjunction with citizen access to a m anaged wilderness. W hen viewed in this light, the Court concludes that the Chiefs decision is in accord with the BW CA W Act, the W ilderness Act, and pru d en t wilderness m anagem ent" (1392). In the end, an argu m ent about institutional authority, coupled with questionable definitional argum ents re garding "access," resolves the issue in favor o f the Forest Service decision to m aintain the m otorized portages.
W hile the D istrict C ourt opinion relies prim arily on a series of definitional argu SCHWARZE ments, the Appeals C ourt focuses m ore on the institutional context of particular defini tions. T he Appeals C ourt intends to elimi nate contention over definitions by devoting m uch of their opinion to determ ing which institution's definition should be authorita tive in this situation. Thus, institutional argu ments m ove into the foreground.
T h e A p p ea ls C ourt O p in io n
In reversing the District C ourt decision, the Appeals C ourt develops a m uch more succinct argum ent about the definition of feasibility. It argues that the definition of "feasible" is clear w hen considered in rela tion to the congressional intent of the Bound ary W aters Act. This turn of the argum ent to Congressional intent is enabled by the court's use of Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council as a precedent case providing the standard for review. In Chev ron, the Suprem e C ourt argued that judicial review of agency action m ust determ ine first w hether the intent o f Congress is clear. If the Appeals C ourt can show that the intent of the A ct is clear, then it does not need to engage in a detailed analysis of the legislative history and compromises that w ent into the Act, and it can dismiss attem pts by the agency to redefine key terms.
T he court cites specific statutory language from the Boundary W aters Act to argue that Congress's intent is clear. T he opinion states that the A ct explicitly includes "preventing: 'further road and commercial developm ent and restoring natural conditions to existing tem porary roads in the wilderness.' Al though som e m otorboats are allowed on the lakes in issue, it is evident that congressional intent was to discourage m otorized uses" (Friends v. Robertson, 1992 , 1487 . Given this purpose o f the Act, the court rejects the no tion that feasible is an ambiguous w ord in the statute: statute a n am b ig u ity w h ich d o es n o t exist. In a p p ly in g th e clearly e x p re sse d in te n t o f C o n g ress, w e can o n ly c o n c lu d e th at 'feasible' m e a n s 'c a p a b le o f b e in g d o n e ' o r 'p h y sically p o ssib le,' a n d as a m a tte r o f law , th e C h ie f e rre d in o rd e rin g th a t th e p o rtag es re m a in o p e n (1488).
O n this basis, the court claims that closing motorized portages "is consistent with the Act;" allowing some portages to rem ain m o torized is m erely "an exception to a clearly expressed m andate" (1487).
Thus, in contrast to the District C ourt's assertion of ambiguity in the term "feasible," the Appeals C ourt eliminates ambiguity by situating the term within the context of a clear institutional m andate: m otorized uses in wilderness areas are to be discouraged. For both courts, then, argum ents about the definition of "feasible" get resolved through argum ents about which institution's defini tions have authority in a particular instance. H ere, institutional m andates articulated by Congress in the W ilderness A ct and B ound ary W aters Act provide the grounds for the court's argum ent. Congress, rather than the Forest Service, is the appropriate institu tional authority regarding this definition.
T he argum ent for clear Congressional in tent, however, gets criticized in the dissent ing opinion w ritten by Ju d g e Magill. In his view, the court "has blindly adopted the def inition of 'feasible' from other statutes w ith out considering w hether Congress intended to adopt that definition" (1490). Yet it is arguable that the majority opinion does so. T he m ajority opinion finds that the purposes of the Boundary W aters Act itself are clear, and then derives the m eaning of "feasible" from these purposes. In addition, the m ajor ity opinion invokes the definition of wilder ness found in the W ilderness Act and then infers that prohibiting m otorized portages is "entirely consistent with the purposes an nounced in these Acts" (1487) . So, the defi nition of feasible in the m ajority opinion depends on accepting the m eaning of feasi ble within the context of the Boundary W a WINTER 2002 ters and W ilderness Acts, not blindly adopt ing a definition stripped from another context.
A lthough Magill's opinion ultimately did not win the day, his dissent reinforces my point that argum ents about institutional au thority are a crucial m eans for resolving ar gum ents about definitions. For Magill, the majority's decision violates the institutional authority that has been delegated to the For est Service; in his view, it is inappropriate for the court to engage in definitional arguments that have the effect of dictating policy to the agency. H e argues that Congress could have clearly stated that they wanted the portages term inated in 1984, but by leaving the pas sage ambiguous they delegated this respon sibility to the Forest Service. "Instead, C on gress directed an executive agency to interpret an ambiguous statutory term and to determ ine at the end of the six-year period w hether the portages should rem ain open" (1491). Magill asserts that this direction must not be taken lightly, since it is crucial in m aintaining proper relationships between branches of governm ent and prom oting re sponsive governm ent.
B ecause C o n g ress d id n o t explicitly define 'feasible n o n m o to riz e d m e a n s ,' I w o u ld d efer to th e F orest S erv ice's reaso n a b le d ecision. T h is co n clu sio n does n o t im p ly a lack o f resp ec t for th e legislative b ra n c h ; in stea d , I b eliev e it fosters resp ect. If C ongress clearly directs, w e ju d g e s will follow . H e re , h o w ev er, it a p p e a rs th a t C o n g ress d e c id e d n o t to d e c id e th e status o f th ese p o rtag es, a n d left th a t decisio n to th e agency. B y d e fe rrin g to th e agency, w e re sp e c t th a t co n g res sional d ecision. M o re o v e r, b y leav in g p o licy d e c i sions to th e politically acco u n ta b le ag en cies rath er th a n th e ju d ic ia ry , w e foster d e m o c ra tic a c c o u n ta b il ity (1493).
Magill's argum ent explicitly reveals the ten sions betw een institutional authority and def initional arguments. Definitions that have the force of law are not determ ined merely b y the best scientific, political, or ecological argum ent; they are produced within institu tional contexts. Thus, resolving definitional questions not only requires argum ents about the definitions themselves; it also requires argum ents about institutional authority over those definitions. Em pow ering definitions, then, has as m uch to do with determ ining whose defini tion counts as with generating a persuasive definition. This relationship betw een defini tional and institutional argum ents leads us to consider the complexities behind Schiappa's assertion that "the only definitions of conse quence are those that have been empowered through persuasion or coercion " (1996,209) . In the Boundary W aters cases, definitions are em pow ered in p art by m eans of persua sion but ultimately by m eans of coercion. Both the District C ourt and the Appeals C ourt use a series of definitional arguments to persuade audiences that a particular defi nition of a term is reasonable. W hen the courts argue that these definitions ultimately are to be determ ined b y a specific governing institution, how ever, they invoke the coer cive pow er of the state to em pow er that in stitution's definitions as authoritative.
But the issue of whose definition counts raises another issue that affects the em pow erm ent of a definition. In particular, I con tend that in the realm of public policy, the em pow erm ent of a definition is dependent on the legitimacy of the institution authorized to define the term , in addition to the dim en sions of persuasion and coercion noted by Schiappa. (While legitimacy is a product of persuasion, it is analytically separate from persuasion about the definition itself.) A def inition will not be em pow ered if the institu tion authorized to define it is not seen as legitimate. So, even w hen a court invokes the coercive pow er of the state to back an institution's definition, their focus on who should define rather than w hat the definition should be foregrounds the legitimacy or sta tus of that institution in the eyes of public advocates.
For exam ple, w hen the District C ourt sup ported the Forest Service definition of "fea sible," public criticism em erged in p art b e SCHWARZE cause the Forest Service was not seen as a legitimate public agency by a significant set of advocates. Preservation advocates felt that the Forest Service had shut them out of de cision-making and had failed to follow the spirit of wilderness legislation in managing the area. Given this view of the agency, the District C ourt's deferral to the Forest Service did not successfully em pow er the definition of "feasible," in spite of the court's consider able efforts to persuade audiences that the definition was reasonable. Thus, preserva tion advocates appealed the District C ourt's decision.
T he B oundary W aters case, then, suggests that neither persuasion nor coercion is suffi cient to em pow er a definition. As argum ents about institutional authority defer defini tional questions to other institutions, those definitions m ay n o t be fully em pow ered if those institutions are not seen as legitimate. An im portant effect of argum ents about in stitutional authority, then, is that they can revive larger questions about the legitimacy of specific governing institutions. W e will see further evidence of this in argum ents in the controversy over snowmobile use in Denali National Park. As in the B oundary W aters, the issue of m otorized access to wilderness is at the heart of the controversy. A nd, as in the Boundary W aters, arguments about this is sue ultimately turn toward argum ents about which institution has authority to fix defini tions for the practiced purpose o f m anage ment.
D e f in in g " A c c e s s " a n d " T r a d i t i o n a l A c t iv it ie s " :
T h e C a s e o f D e n a l i
T he use of snowmobiles in D enali N a tional Park has em erged as a public issue for two m ain reasons. First, snowmobile access has generated controversy because the pop ularity of snowmobiling has rapidly in creased in the past decade. Consequently, private snowm obile associations and snow RHETORICAL TRACTION mobile m anufacturers have becom e identifi able, active groups interested in influencing park m anagem ent policies. Second, the in creasing popularity of snowm obiling has led to m ore use of the park by snowmobilers, but the N ational Park Service has articulated unclear policies and exercised inconsistent enforcem ent regarding snowm obile opera tion in Denali. As with the Boundary W a ters, the legislation designating wilderness areas inside the park contains ambiguous terms that provide the grounds for com pet ing argum ents about m otorized access.
The Alaska National Interest Lands C on servation Act, or A N ILCA , is the main source of ambiguity about m otorized access. In addition to this definitional problem , A N ILCA also is a source of ambiguity re garding institutional authority over m otor ized use. Again, section 1110(a) provides the WINTER 2002 relevant passage describing agency discre tion in m anaging m otorized access: S uch u se shall b e subject to rea so n a b le reg u latio n s by th e S ecretary to p ro te c t th e n a tu ra l a n d o th e r values o f th e co n serv a tio n system units, n a tio n a l recreatio n areas, a n d n a tio n a l co n serv a tio n areas, a n d shall n o t b e p ro h ib ite d unless, after no tice a n d h e a rin g in the vicinity o f th e affected u n it o r area, th e S ecretary finds th a t such use w o u ld b e d etrim e n ta l to the r e so u rce v alu es o f th e u n it o r area.
This passage suggests that institutional au thority to regulate m otorized use ultimately lies with the Secretary of the Interior. H ow ever, advocates for m otorized use challenge this position, arguing that Congress estab lished a clear rationale for m otorized access in ANILCA. Thus, a second line of argu m ent about access emerges regarding which institution's definitions should determ ine the extent of m otorized access.
These definitional and institutional argu ments coalesced when the D enali Park Su perintendent issued tem porary regulations in N ovem ber 1998 and February 1999 that banned snowmobile use in the O ld Park. T he Alaska State Snowmobile Association took the Park Service to court, and in N o vem ber 1999 the District C ourt rem anded the decision to the Park Service. In this sec tion of the essay, I will briefly exam ine pub lic advocacy by the ASSA and the Park Ser vice about those regulations before turning to the District C ourt's opinion. I draw atten tion to the public advocacy in this contro versy since those texts illustrate how easily the definitional argum ents about access turn into arguments about institutional authority, even outside the judicial arena. T hen, as in the Boundary W aters exam ple, I show how the court opinion resolves those definitional argum ents by way of institutional arguments. H ow ever, this argum ent overgeneralizes the m eaning of access as described in ANILCA. T h e ASSA article asserts that cit izens have a broad right to m otorized access, but it does not address A N ILCA 's limita tions on that right. Specifically, the article ignores the fact that snowmobile access is lim ited; they are only to be used in conjunc tion with traditional activities such as h u n t ing. A N ILCA articulates a clear relationship betw een snowmobile use and other activi ties: In the O ld Park, snow m achine use must be instrumental; it is a m eans for pursuing other activities, not an end in itself. T he ASSA's argum ent, then, overgeneralizes this limited sense of access w hen it claims that ! SCHWARZE A N ILCA allows m otorized access. O nly through this overgeneralization can they m aintain their argum ent about a history of continuous m otorized access.
In itia l P u b lic A rgu m en ts
In contrast, National Park Service press releases build the case that prohibiting snow mobiles in the O ld Park provides continuity in policies regarding access. For exam ple, a N ovem ber 1998 press release claims that the regulations are a "continued closure" of the O ld Park, and that traditional snowmachine use "was not allowed in the form er M ount M cKinley N ational Park" (National Park Service, "Snowm achine"). Further, the NPS argues that m otorized use of the area prior to A NILCA also was illegal: "R ecreational use of snowmachines in the form er M ount M c Kinley National Park was neither customary or [sic] traditional, and was, in fact prohib ited by regulation." A February 1999 press release also emphasizes continuity by point ing to specific sections o f ANILCA: "In the form er M ount M cKinley National Park, there was no history of authorized general public snowmobile use for any activity, tra ditional or otherwise. T he enactm ent of sec tion 1110(a) of A N ILCA left this general prohibition of snowmobile use in the old park area intact unless the snowmobile use was for the purpose of conducting a 'tradi tional activity' " (National Park Service, "Portion"). Taken together, these claims de pict an O ld Park from which snowmachines have always been banned, thus suggesting that the NPA has m aintained a continuous policy regarding m otorized access.
These competing arguments about continu ity of policy regarding access are grounded in appeals to institutional authority. Argu ments about institutional authority dom inate the discussion of m otorized access in Denali. Specifically, decisions about snowmobile ac cess turn on arguments about which institu tion has authority on this issue. As the con troversy moves toward the judicial arena, the ASSA and the NPS (as well as the W ilder ness Society, an intervenor in the suit) all attem pt to articulate their substantive posi tions on m anagem ent in term s of the appro priate institutional decision-maker.
The ASSA, for example, questions whether the park superintendent has authority to en act regulations against snowm obile use. In the ASSA's N ovem ber 1997 article, G auna hints that the superintendent's authority over snowmobile use is limited. H e claims that Park Superintendent Steve M artin has taken a definite position for keeping the O ld Park m otor free and that M artin is pursuing his personal preference rather than being ac countable to requirem ents and regulations. "[The superintendent] said that his legal p eo ple have told him that superintendent's or ders are not the pro p er way to im plem ent snowmobile regulations (as well as som e oth ers) and that's why he is w orking on the regulations package that includes the snow m obile closure." H ere, the threat of a super intendent's unbridled discretion hovers over the m anagem ent process. T he ASSA article raises an early concern about the superinten dent overstepping his institutional authority.
T he ASSA continues to press the issue of institutional authority in their response to the tem porary regulations issued in February 1999, further raising questions about the le gitimacy of the Park Service and their deci sion-making procedures. They placed a copy of the NPS announcem ent of the regulation on their website and responded point-bypoint to a num ber of passages, and also p ro vided a link to a form letter that could be emailed to the Superintendent. T he response directly challenges the NPS claim that the O ld Park has never been open to snow m o biles, using statutory justification to support their argum ent. T he ASSA states that ANILCA "addressed snowmobiles, affirm ing the right to use them in 'back country' areas (a designation given to the original M ount M cKinley N ational Park)." Then, they contrast this statutory justification with the questionable foundation of the tem po rary regulations: "W hat has happened is the D enali staff has prohibited snowmobile use in this area through a 'Superintendants [sic] O rder,' which is on shaky ground from a legal standpoint." This contrast m arks an im portant shift in the pattern of argument, as they turn away from the continuity or con sistency of the policy itself and begin to ques tion the institutional, authority exercised to prom ulgate the regulations.
Argum ents about institutional authority are the basis not only of the ASSA lawsuit challenging the regulations; interestingly, they also are at the heart of the W ilderness Society's own lawsuit against the NPS and their m otion opposing the ASSA suit. For the ASSA, the tem porary regulations are too restrictive; for the W ilderness Society, the regulations are not restrictive enough. These positions on m otorized access, however, eventually get translated into arguments about institutional authority during the course of clarifying the policy. Ju st as the ASSA argues that the superintendent does not have the authority to close areas to snow mobile use, the W ilderness Society argues that the NPS does not have authority to keep open two narrow corridors for snowmobile use in the O ld Park. Thus, both advocacy groups use the AN ILCA legislation to chal lenge Park Service decisions that appear to overstep the boundary between statutory m andate and agency discretion. Arguments about snowmobiles get rearticulated as argu m ents about institutions.
T h e D istrict C ourt O p in io n
It is not surprising, then, that institutional argum ents provide the ultimate basis for the District C ourt opinion that rem anded the agency's decision on regulations to the Sec retary of the Interior. This interpretation of the court's opinion differs from the interpre tation offered in new spaper accounts of the decision, which claim that the court's opin ion was based on a definitional issue: the Park Service's failure to define the phrase "traditional activities." A lthough the NPS did not define that phrase clearly, an analysis of the opinion shows that arguments about institutional authority serve as grounds for the definitional argum ents and thus provide the ultimate rationale for the court's decision. Institutional argum ents justify the accep tance or rejection of a particular definition.
T he court's opinion identifies the Secre tary o f the Interior as having the institutional authority to determ ine the appropriate defi nition of "traditional activities." T he opinion begins by disposing argum ents that the court should exam ine the legislative history of A N ILCA to determ ine the legality of the snowmobile ban: "O f course, as Justice Scalia has observed, it is the language o f statutes, not the language of legislative history, which is enacted as law by Congress. H ere, where Congress failed to define 'traditional activi ties' in A N ILCA , Congress did include a statutory authorization em pow ering the Sec retary to adopt regulations necessary to carry out the law" v. Babbitt 7). In this pas sage, the court clarifies the delegation of au thority from Congress to the administrative agency, which gives the Secretary authority to make regulations to execute the law. Thus, the opinion invokes an argum ent about institutional authority that allows the court to situate the resolution of definitional questions within a specific governing institu tion.
Resituating the definitional question in this way allows the court to establish a straightforward definitional argum ent based on the words of the Secretary. T he opinion turns to the 1986 D enali regulations in which the Secretary argues that there is no statutory support in A N ILC A for banning snow m o biles in the O ld Park. T hus, the opinion relies on the prior argum ents of the control ling institutional authority to determ ine the definition that applies in this instance. R e gardless of the definitions that are possible, the Secretary's definition is determ inative: "Although the Secretary m ight have defined SCHWARZE traditional activities in the m anner suggested by W ilderness Society-the court does not now decide w hether such an interpretation could be consistent with A N IL C A -the Sec retary has not done so. U nder these circum stances, this court rejects W ilderness Soci ety's argum ent. It follows that the Decision violates AN ILCA for the reason previously explained" (9). In other words, the Secre tary's earlier interpretation found no statu tory support for a ban, and thus the court is obligated to follow the Secretary's earlier interpretation of the statute as definitive. By appealing to the earlier argum ent of the con trolling authority, the court finds that the tem porary regulations of February 1999 vi olate ANILCA.
Thus, it is not solely a definitional argu m ent that grounded the court's decision. The definitional argum ent is em bedded within a determ ination of whose definition and inter pretation of the statute has authority. In this case, the Secretary's definition, ascertained through analysis of previous regulations, de termines the court's judgm ent about the new regulations. Since the ruling, the Park Ser vice has drafted new regulations that address the definitional problem surrounding "tradi tional activities." Nonetheless, these key def initional assertions m ust com e from the ap propriate institutional authority in order to have rhetorical and legal force. In these cases about m otorized access to wilderness, then, argum ents about institutional authority have rhetorical prim acy over arguments about definitions.
T h e P r im a c y o f I n s t i t u t i o n a l A r g u m e n t s : T h e o r e t ic a l a n d P r a c t i c a l I m p l ic a t io n s T he Boundary W aters and D enali cases dem onstrate how argum ents about institu tional authority play a crucial role in estab lishing definitions used in the im plem enta tion of public policy. N ot only do those arguments help resolve definitional disputes, b u t also they function to negotiate the legit imacy o f governing institutions. T he illustra tion of this process leads back to the theoret ical issues surrounding definitions, institutional arguments, and hegem ony raised in the in troduction of this essay. In this section, I elaborate on each of these areas by discuss ing the im portance and rhetorical effects of argum ents about institutional authority, us ing exam ples from these cases to illustrate m y arguments.
First, I suggested that this study contrib utes to argum entation scholarship by speci fying institutional argum ents as a significant influence on definitions that get fixed as part o f the policy process. T he Boundary W aters and Denali cases described above show how easily argum ents about the definitions of term s like "feasible," "access," and "tradi tional activities" are subsum ed by argum ents about institutional authority.
The im portance of this influence emerges w hen we consider one of the potential rhe torical effects of institutional arguments. A r guments about institutional authority allow the courts to deflect definitional questions, with the effect o f perpetuating political conflict over defini tions. Both the Boundary W aters and Denali cases show how a court's deferral o f defini tional questions prolongs rhetorical struggle and moves it to other institutional sites. Take the case of the B oundary W aters: the A p peals C ourt's argum ents about institutional authority directed advocates to take their claims to Congress. So, advocates who found fault with the Appeals C ourt decision en couraged Senator Rod Gram s and R epresen tative Jim O berstar to hold Congressional field hearings and propose new legislation for Boundary W aters m anagem ent through out the mid-1990s. R ather than settle a def initional dispute, the C ourt's argum ents about institutional authority prolonged the dispute and shifted it toward a different poli cymaking forum (Jones and T aylor 331).
This shift o f forum points to the second issue raised at the outset of this essay. I sug WINTER 2002 gested that argum ents about institutional au thority function rhetorically to negotiate the legitimacy of state institutions. W hen courts assert that a particular institution Has the authority to define a term for policy pur poses, then questions of legitimacy emerge for that institution. W ith every invocation of an argum ent about institutional authority, the courts imply that some other part of the policy-making apparatus (Congress, the For est Service, the Park Service) should be ac cepted as the rightful definer of key terms. H ow ever, this acceptance is based not only on the court's assertion of definitional au thority; w hether that authority will be ac cepted as legitimate depends upon the broader public perception of the institution. Thus, we can note a second im portant rhe torical effect of institutional arguments. By focusing on who should define the term rather than on the definition itself, arguments about institutional authority raise the issue o f an institution' s legitimacy.
T he Boundary W aters and D enali cases are especially useful for discussing the rela tionship betw een institutional arguments and legitimacy because they show how insti tutional arguments can have divergent, un even effects on the legitimacy of governing institutions. In that regard, the cases provide a useful counterpoint to D oxtader's claim that institutional justifications shut down conflict in order to preserve institutional sta bility. As he puts it, "Justificatory arguments are sites w here the interests o f the public and the institutional-instrumental process of sta bility m aintenance meet.... Critique shows how institutions collapse the relational ele m ents of justificatory argum ent into a selfperpetuating argum ent form that reifies pro cesses of public interest formation in the nam e of pre-given norm s o f stability " (197) . Although a governing institution justifies its decisions in order to stabilize relationships between citizens and the institution, the wil derness access cases reveal that institutional argum ents m ay stabilize some institutions b u t can destabilize others.
For exam ple, in these cases argum ents about institutional authority allow the courts to bolster their legitimacy. W hen courts side step definitional questions in favor of argu m ents about institutional authority, they can avoid the appearance of being "active"; de ferral to agency definitions allows the courts to appear that they are not legislating from the bench. Creating this appearance is im portant for the courts in light of criticisms that courts have squashed adm inistrative dis cretion in reviewing agency decisions (for criticisms see Rabkin, Shapiro; for a defense, see Clayton). So, even as the courts engage in definitional argum ents to support agency interpretations or to specify Congressional intent, their ultim ate argum ents about insti tutional authority function to show that the court is n o t overstepping its bounds. A rgu m ents that focus on institutional authority can help the courts appear as if they are not actively intervening in agency decisionm ak ing o r creating their own definitions of stat utory terms. Thus, by subsum ing definitional questions within argum ents about institu tional authority, courts can minimize the ap pearance of actively im posing their own pol icy preferences and bolster their legitimacy.4
For other institutions, however, the defer ral o f definitional questions back to Congress or the agencies raises the issue of the legiti m acy o f those institutions. As suggested above, public acceptance of an institution's definitional authority depends on w hether that institution is seen as legitimate. In both the Boundary W aters and Denali cases, for example, public acceptance of an agency's definition hinged on the perception of those agencies as adhering to the m andates of Congress (in the Boundary W aters) and m aking decisions that were n o t m erely per sonal preference of agency personnel (in D e nali). These perceptions of legitimacy are brought into the foreground when courts claim that a particular institution has author ity to establish definitions. H ence, arguments about institutional authority need to be as sessed with regard to the range of potential effects on governing institutions. Institu tional arguments do not necessarily shore up the stability of institutions; they may heighten the legitimacy of one institution, and bring another institution's legitimacy problem s into sharp relief.
These divergent and uneven effects of in stitutional argum ents on legitimacy are in structive for the study of hegem ony and the role of the rhetoric of state institutions in the formation of consent, the third issue raised at the outset of this essay. Specifically, the diver gent effects o f institutional arguments on legiti macy make those arguments especially useful for examining the role that state institutions play in the constitution o f hegemony. T he implications I have already drawn show how institutional arguments are productive of both consent and dissent. T o the extent that arguments about institutional authority generate some degree of adherence to state institutions, w hether through unspoken agreem ent or the ongoing disagreements within other institu tional forums, it m ay be argued that these arguments are productive o f consent to state institutions. T hat is, participation in or acqui escence to the policy process m ay be taken as a sign that a basic level of legitimacy has been achieved by state institutions as a whole. In this view, dissent is m anaged by transferring conflict from one institution to another, and the state continues to exercise hegem ony over the transformation of wild ness into "wilderness" (for an extrem e form o f this argum ent, see Birch) .
But shifting the conflict to another institu tion m ay encourage advocates to further question the legitimacy of that institution. T he courts' argum ents about institutional au thority draw attention to the institutions themselves, to whose definition should have authority. So, even as conflicts get trans ferred from one institution to the another, that m ay only reinforce negative perceptions o f those institutions. If a court opinion m erely ratifies the authority of an alreadym aligned agency, that ratification does little to bolster the agency's legitimacy and heightens the sense that the agency is insu lated from public criticism. Further, the transfer o f conflict from one forum to an other m ay dam age the legitimacy of the state as a whole, if it appears that none of the institutions can provide a decisive definition or policy (W ondolleck 105-118) . To the ex tent that argum ents about institutional au thority provoke generalized dissatisfaction with state institutions, these argum ents can generate dissent even as they attem pt to dis place it.
A ttention to how state rhetorics generate both consent and dissent provides an im por tant qualification and addition to dom inant theorizations of hegem ony within rhetorical scholarship. M y argum ent above about the divergent and uneven effects of institutional argum ents on legitimacy reinforces the com m on claim that the exercise of hegem ony is best characterized as the dynam ic process of producing consent rather than the m ono lithic imposition of a dom inant ideology (Condit) . H ow ever, producing consent does not only consist of forging an accom m oda tion on substantive, definitional issues. Hege mony also requires the production o f consent to the procedural, institutional means by which substan tive issues get resolved. As I have argued here and elsewhere, institutional argum ents m ay be productive of hegem ony to the extent that they channel further disagreem ent within in WINTER 2002 stitutional boundaries, but they also may function to undercut hegem ony to the extent that they erode the legitimacy of governing institutions (Schwarze). Thus, scholars con cerned with the rhetorical dimensions of h e gem ony would do well to include the argu ments of governing institutions in their analyses, and to address the m ultiple levels on which those argum ents contribute to the production of consent.
This analysis of institutional arguments, then, suggests how studies of hegem ony m ight be com plem ented by turning a critical eye toward the rhetorics of governing insti tutions. So far work on hegem ony within com m unication studies has tended to focus on civil society rhetorics.5 This focus on stems in part from a reading of Gramsci that relies on a sharp distinction between the State and civil society, where the term "he gem ony" nam es the type of leadership exer cised in civil society and "dom ination" char acterizes the coercive pow er of the state. In this reading, hegem ony produces consent am ong citizens; w hen consent dissolves, the State apparatus exercises dom ination through repressive force. An early passage in Prison Notebooks captures this distinction con cisely:
W h a t w e c a n d o, for th e m o m e n t, is to fix tw o m ajor su p e rstru ctu ral " levels" : th e o n e th a t ca n b e called "civil society", th a t is th e e n sem b le o f organism s c o m m o n ly called "p riv a te ", a n d th a t o f "political so ciety " o r "th e S tate." T h e se tw o levels co rre sp o n d o n th e o n e h a n d to th e function o f "h e g e m o n y " w hich th e d o m in a n t g ro u p exercises th ro u g h o u t so ciety a n d o n th e o th e r h a n d to th a t o f "d ire c t dom i-5 C ondit's w ork on reproductive technologies analyzes popular m agazine an a national new spaper articles. C loud develops h er critique of C ondit's view of hege m ony via an analysis o f television and m agazine biogra phies o f O p rah VVinfrey. H anke an d D ow exam ine tele vision shows in o rder to exam ine hegem onic versions of m asculinity and fem ininity, respectively. A nd while M um by does n ot undertake an em pirical study in his essay on hegem ony, he does argue that G ram sci's atten tion to civil society should be em ulated in future critical scholarship, since it "creates greater possibilities for ex am ining gaps an d fissures in the prevailing ideology" (365). n a tio n " o r c o m m a n d ex ercise d th ro u g h th e S tate a n d "ju rid ica l" g o v e rn m e n t (12). This passage gets invoked by M um by (347) and C ondit (206) to w arrant the focus on civil society. As M um by puts it, "hegem ony resides prim arily in the realm of civil society (although it can be exercised also by the State)" (348). In spite of this admission about the role of the state in producing hegem ony, there has been little exam ination of that role within com m unication studies.6 Scholars have produced num erous studies of the h e gem onic and counter-hegem onic rhetorics within civil society, but they have barely explored the state's role in hegem ony or problem atized Gram sci's explanation of the relationship betw een civil society and the state.
N ear the end of the Prison Notebooks, how ever, Gramsci explicitly links state institu tions to the exercise of hegem ony. In a sec tion on the separation of state powers, Gram sci suggests that each of the branches of the state have an im portant hegem onic function: "N aturally all three pow ers are also organs of political hegem ony: 1. Legislature; 2. Judiciary; 3. Executive" (246) . H ere, Gramsci hints that governing institutions can function as sites at w hich hegem ony is exer cised. A t these sites, the state contributes to hegem ony n o t simply in the form of coer cion or direct dom ination, but by rhetori cally producing consent and m anaging dis sent with regard to the exercise of state pow er. W hen the courts, administrative agencies, and legislative bodies produce ar gum ents that define and justify public policy, those institutions contribute to the hege m onic process by articulating provisional ac com m odations on public policy and negoti 6 T h e exception to this claim is M. L inda M iller's essay o n how legislative d ebate transform ed m any o f the p u b lic argum ents surrounding m idwifery legislation in Flor ida. H er essay suggests that institutional com m itm ents constrain the rhetoric produced in legislative bodies; m y essay suggests that sim ilar sorts o f com m itm ents con strain the argum ents p roduced by courts. SCHWARZE ating state legitimacy. T he introduction of this essay intended to display a specific ex am ple of this contribution. State institutions directly influence m y experience of wilder ness, n o t by influencing m y perceptions of wilderness, or by offering a philosophical defense of w hat wilderness ought to be, but b y determ ining which institution gets to de fine the term s by which practical, material m anagem ent decisions are m ade. By exam ining these institutional argum ents, then, rhetorical scholars can better understand the full range of voices that influence the opera tion of hegem ony.
In a practical vein, the im portance of in stitutional arguments dem onstrated in this essay suggests that advocates can gain rhe torical traction by appealing to institutional concerns in controversies on other public lands. W e can already see evidence of this in one of the m ost notable controversies m en tioned at the beginning of this essay: snow m obile access in Yellowstone N ational Park. T he W inter U se Plan for Yellowstone and G rand Teton N ational Parks, released in N o vem ber 2000, proposed a phased-out ban on snowmobiles in those parks by the w inter of [2003] [2004] . Even before the plan was re leased, advocates em ployed institutional ar guments to raise concerns about the legiti m acy of the agency's Plan. For example, Representative Barbara C ubin (R-WY) claimed that the Park Service failed to in clude the public in planning and fulfill other institutional responsibilities as required by law. "Throughout the process, the National Park Service has disregarded the views of the public, the application of sound science and the Administrative Procedures Act" (Graver, B l). T hen in Ju n e 2001, the D epartm ent of the Interior essentially overturned the plan, setding a lawsuit brought against the agency by the International Snowmobile M anufac turers Association. T he settlem ent lifted the snowmobile ban and required a new envi ronm ental study to be com pleted in 2002 ("Politics, N ot Science") . As this settlem ent was being developed, critics com plained that the Bush adm inistration had inappropriately exercised its institutional authority, ignoring the Park's extensive environm ental im pact statem ent and shutting out local park person nel from settlem ent discussions. In the words of form er Yellowstone Park Superintendent Mike Finley: "H ad the Park been asked, we would have resisted setdem ent and sought a vigorous defense. W e w ere n o t asked. In over six and a half years at Yellowstone, I was involved in every m ajor and m inor law suit. I was co n su lted This is the first time the opinion of the Park was not sought, or solicited, or considered by the adm inistra tion" (G reater Yellowstone Coalition).
These argum ents underscore that battles over access on federal lands often get fought at the level of institutional authority. A dvo cates thus would do well to consider how argum ents about institutional authority could be used to influence the policy p ro cess. In particular, advocates for minim izing snowmobile use could benefit by em phasiz ing the Congressional m andate to preserve parks unim paired for future generations, and by questioning the legitimacy of an adm in istration that overturns its own agency's pol icy. T he latter argum ent is especially im por tant in this instance, given that the NPS policy was based on over a decade of thor ough scientific studies and three years of public com m ent on m anagem ent proposals. T he assertion of institutional authority by the Secretary of the Interior in this situation raises serious questions about the adm inis tration's legitimacy.
C o n c l u s i o n
M y m ost recent wilderness excursion took a friend and m e into the G reat Bum , an area in the Bitterroot M ountains straddling the M ontana-Idaho border. This ragged m aze of ridges, creeks and high m ountain lakes was in the h eart of the forest fires o f 1910 that burned over 3 million acres of national for \VINTER 2002 ests in M ontana and Idaho. W e knew that the area was proposed for wilderness desig nation and had heard several great reports about the backcountry hiking there. W e thought it would be an ideal place for a weekend in the wilderness.
M y friend and I were especially disap pointed, then, w hen we arrived at Fish Lake. After a dem anding hike that took us along the M ontana-Idaho border ridge and chal lenged us with several ascents and descents, we looked forward to a quiet, relaxing evening by a rem ote wilderness lake. In stead, as we descended into Fish Lake we were greeted by w hat we thought at first were chain saws. But as we got closer, it was apparent that the sounds w ere com ing from all-terrain vehicles. W e were no longer in the backcountry; we w ere in ATV-Land. This affected our "wilderness" experience in several ways. T he constant A TV traffic past our campsite and the random start-up of the m achines elim inated the possibility for uninterrupted, quiet solitude, which was why I took the trip in the first place. Further, even in the m iddle o f another dry summer, the hiking trails are packed relatively hard and create negligible am ounts of dust. But at the point where our trail m et the trail being used by A T Vs, the soil turned into a fine dust that hung in the air and on the trees, and quickly becam e a part of our meal and our sleeping bags. M ost of all, it ruined w hat was other wise a great day. It was disappointing to work that hard, get ten miles into the backcountry, and then have to deal with an un expected, unw anted intrusion.
It is easy to dismiss these concerns as spe cial pleading from a backpacker who wants to have the wilderness all to himself, who believes that som e forms of recreation are "better" than others, and who simply wants his way. To be sure, there are good philo sophical and environm ental arguments that support the com plete elimination of m otor ized access in wilderness areas. But those arguments are not necessary here. Even my friend, a great outdoorsm an but certainly not som eone who identifies him self as an envi ronm entalist, openly expressed his disap pointm ent about the experience. In this sit uation, it is less a m atter of philosophy than a m atter of expectations, a certain trust that the Forest Service will m anage public lands in accordance with the law. This failure to m anage in accordance with law erodes the legitimacy of the Forest Ser vice and connects this case to the problem s I have already outlined with m anagem ent in the Boundary W aters and Denali. In the case of the G reat Bum , the problem again stems from a definitional issue and an issue of in stitutional authority. T he G reat B um area is m anaged by two different National Forests, the Lolo N F on the M ontana side and the Clearw ater N F on the Idaho side. Each For est is legally required to m anage in accor dance with its Forest Plan (the official m an agem ent docum ent, revised every 10-15 years). O n both the Lolo and the Clearwater, Forest Service personnel are directed to m anage large portions of the G reat B um (including the Fish Lake area) as wilderness until a statutory decision is m ade about the area. T he plans direct the Forest Service to "protect the wilderness character of p ro posed wilderness areas until Congress makes classification decisions" (Clark) . N ot surpris ingly, the phrase "wilderness character" is open to definitional dispute, and the two Forests have operationally defined this phrase in contrasting ways. O n the Lolo, protecting wilderness character m eans ex cluding m otorized use, while on the C lear w ater m anagers have allowed m otorized use in proposed wilderness. Given these con trasting exercises of agency discretion, three environm ental groups have filed suit to p ro hibit motorized access on areas proposed as wilderness o n the C learw ater, arguing that the Clearw ater's m anagem ent practices have degraded the area's "wilderness character."
As in the other wilderness access cases, one can anticipate that the decision about SCHWARZE the G reat B um will turn on arguments about w hich institution has authority to define "wil derness character." W hether that authority lies at the Forest level, with the C hief of the Forest Service, o r with Congress and its def inition in the W ilderness Act, m y excursion into the G reat B um m ade it all too clear that the placem ent of definitional authority has a significant effect on w hat m ight ultimately pass for wilderness. M erely passing across a state border, from one National Forest into an adjacent Forest, fundam entally altered the character of wilderness. T hat experience reinforced the underlying assumption of this essay: argum ents about institutional author ity offer a fruitful area for research, not only for the purpose of advancing theories of ar gum entation and hegem ony, but also for the purpose o f preparing public advocates to engage and criticize hegem onic accom m o dations produced by state institutions.
